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During 2025, the global economy has defied the most pessimistic forecasts. Growth has held up, inflation has moderated unevenly but persistently, and financial markets have delivered extraordinary returns. Yet this macroeconomic resilience conceals a less comfortable reality: the system is increasingly resting on fragile foundations, particularly in financial and institutional terms. In this context, the probability of a sharp short-term correction —in months, not years— is now significantly higher than the optimistic consensus suggests.
The latest projections point to a mild slowdown in global growth in 2026. This is not an imminent recession scenario, but rather a weaker expansion in an environment of heightened geopolitical and political uncertainty. This combination is delicate: when growth “holds,” markets tend to stretch valuations; but when the margin for error narrows, any disappointment can have a disproportionate impact on asset prices.
In the United States, equity markets are trading at historically demanding levels. The problem is not only valuations, but extreme concentration: a very large share of index value is concentrated in a small number of major companies. In such environments, corrections do not require major macroeconomic shocks; a revision of expectations (the AI bubble) in just a few dominant stocks is enough to trigger pro-cyclical mechanisms —forced rebalancing, automated selling, leverage effects— that accelerate declines.
This fragility is compounded by the rebound of the U.S. banking sector. Trump has promoted progressive deregulation and a revival of investment banking. Rising market capitalization and profitability have reinforced the perception that risk is under control. But the change in incentives is clear: when the regulatory “price” of risk falls, the willingness to take risk increases. Historically, this pattern has preceded major corrections (the last financial crisis being a clear example).
One defining feature of the current moment is the displacement of risk outside the traditional banking perimeter. The rapid growth of non-bank financial intermediaries —private credit, alternative investment vehicles— makes the system appear more resilient, but in reality more opaque and harder to monitor. When sentiment shifts, these channels can transmit stress very quickly to the core of the financial system.
A revealing symptom of fragility is the coexistence of record highs in risk assets with strong demand for safe havens such as gold. This dual behavior suggests that beneath the apparent optimism, investors retain latent anxiety about the possibility of a sudden cycle turn. It seems everyone is waiting for the moment to run for the exits.
The most underestimated risk is not strictly macroeconomic, but monetary-institutional. The extraordinary volume of U.S. public debt, constant refinancing needs, and growing political pressure on the independence of the Federal Reserve create a delicate scenario. A perception of politicized monetary policy —for example, rate decisions seen as subordinated to fiscal objectives— could trigger a rapid loss of confidence, leading to a weaker dollar, rising risk premia, and a sharp repricing of real interest rates.
For Europe, this risk is particularly acute: exposure to U.S. assets is high and fragmented, with no clear collective strategy. In a confidence-shock scenario, the correction could be imported immediately through financial channels.
Artificial intelligence is the dominant narrative of the current cycle. Yet the history of major technological transformations shows a recurring pattern of booms and busts. If expectations of productivity and profit growth fail to materialize as quickly as anticipated, the correction may coincide with other financial and monetary tensions, amplifying its impact.
A global recession is not required for a sharp correction to occur. The combination of stretched valuations and concentration, deregulation and financial euphoria, growing risk outside the banking perimeter, safe-haven signals, and monetary-institutional uncertainty creates an environment in which the system is highly sensitive to confidence shocks. If a correction arrives, it will not be because the global economy collapses, but because the framework supporting current valuations can break suddenly. In a highly interconnected and leveraged world, this can happen faster than consensus expects.
Possible triggering events:
A sudden rise in U.S. inflation due to delayed pass-through of tariffs to final prices.
A downgrade of U.S. sovereign credit or a negative outlook revision.
Failure or redemption suspension of a major private credit fund.
Quarterly earnings far below expectations at a dominant big tech firm.
A major AI failure that undermines confidence in massive investment.
A sudden military escalation (U.S. invasion of Greenland).
A serious incident in the Taiwan Strait disrupting supply chains and semiconductors.
An unexpected cutoff of critical energy supply with immediate price impact.
A cyberattack linked to hybrid warfare.
Collapse of a major stablecoin issuer with contagion to money markets.
Rapid reallocation of international reserves away from the dollar by a major creditor.
